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of government support for quite some time. A much higher
employment rate is essential to ensure a more balanced
fiscal impact.
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Notes
1 Due to data restrictions, the selection of countries in figure 3 differs to some
extent from the selection in figure 2. 
2 The dependency ratio is defined as the number of benefit recipients as a
percentage of the working population. The figures presented here are exclu-
sive of old-age pensions. As employment at the age of 65 and older is almost
negligible, the dependency ratio as defined above, practically speaking,
relates to the population under that age. It should be noted that refugees are
young on average, so that a relatively long time elapses before their old-age
pensions are to be paid. This decreases the fiscal burden associated with
refugees. Yet, even if we were to include old-age pensions of the indigenous
population in the dependency ratio, while we leave them out entirely for
refugees, the dependency ratio of refugees would still be three times as high
as that of the indigenous population.
3 These include, for the Netherlands, immigrants from Turkey, Morocco,
Surinam, the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba.
4 See note 1.
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Abstract
CPB’s applied general equilibrium model for the Dutch
economy, MIMIC, has recently been extended to include
the effects of taxation on training incentives. This paper
elaborates on the training model. Furthermore, it illus-
trates how the extension with a training model affects
the simulation results of MIMIC. I find that the incor-
poration of a training  model has important implica-
tions for the quality of the labour supply, especially in 
tax experiments that substantially affect the marginal
tax burden.
Introduction
CPB usually adopts its applied general equilibrium model
MIMIC to explore the labour-market implications of tax
reforms. The model focuses on adequately describing
wage formation, labour supply and demand, and the
process of job matching between vacancies and unem-
ployed persons looking for a job. By including elements
of wage bargaining and costly job matching, MIMIC
describes equilibrium unemployment in terms of the struc-
ture of the tax system and the features of social insurance.
MIMIC is designed to help Dutch policymakers investigate
the structural labour-market implications of changes in
the tax system. 
Although the previous version of MIMIC (described in
Gelauff and Graafland (1994)) yields a number of impor-
tant insights into the labour-market effects of tax reforms,
it does not capture the impact of high marginal tax rates
on motivation and on-the-job training. These qualitative
aspects, however, are receiving increasing attention from
policymakers and economists in knowledge-based
economies. The new version of MIMIC therefore incor-
porates training decisions. This article discusses how this
is done and what the implications of the training model
are for various tax experiments.
Structure of the model
The model adopts a concept developed by Boone (1998).
In this framework, employed individuals can move between
states that differ with respect to their employability lev-
els. By investing time and effort in training, workers raise
the probability of moving into a state with a higher employ-
ability level and a correspondingly higher wage rate.2
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Figure 1 illustrates the stocks and flows in the training
model. We use the term ‘skill’ for the initial skill level of a
worker (i.e. someone is low skilled (L) or high skilled (H)).
This skill depends on the initial educational level of a
worker, i.e. the level before he/she started to work. At both
skill levels, workers are subdivided into less employable
(U) and more employable workers (Z).
Workers in each state in figure 1 maximise utility by
choosing between enrolment in a training programme or
not. In making this choice, households trade off the effort
cost and benefits of training. The effort cost is heteroge-
nous, as some workers need to spend more effort (or
leisure time) than others to successfully finish the pro-
gramme. For less employable workers, the benefits of
training take the form of a higher probability of moving
towards the high-employability state in which they earn
a higher wage (captured by Pu in figure 1). For more-
employable workers, the benefits of training amount to a
lower probability of moving from the high employability 
state towards the low employability state (captured by Pz
in figure 1). Indeed, compared to more-employable work-
ers that undergo training, workers that do not participate
in training have a greater probability of losing  their skills,
e.g. due to depreciation of human capital or because new
technologies make current skills worthless.3
Apart from training, low-skilled workers may partici-
pate in formal education. In this way, they may exchange
their low-skilled status for a high-skilled status. High-skilled
workers have little incentive to enrol in formal education
because they are unable to further improve their skill level.
The choice for low-skilled workers to enrol in education
is determined by trading off the cost of education, which
is determined by an (heterogenous) effort cost, and the
benefits of education. These benefits are determined by
the increase in the probability that the worker will become
skilled, in which case he will earn a higher after-tax wage.
Using a probability density function of the effort cost
of training (education), we can determine, for each effort
cost, the fraction of workers that participate in training
(education). These fractions determine the aggregate tran-
sition rates between the different states of figure 1, which 
are indicated by Pi for i = U, Z, L. Fractions and transition
rates are affected by the tax system. In particular, if the
after-tax wage in a more-employable state increases rel-
ative to a less-employable state, then the value of the effort
cost at which a household is indifferent between train-
ing and no training increases. Accordingly, more house-
holds will find it attractive to enrol in training.4 From the
macro transition rates, we can derive the steady-state
stock of workers in each of the states of figure 1. In the
steady state, the share of high-skilled workers is fixed,
due to an exogenous inflow of new, young and low-edu-
cated workers, and an exogenous outflow of old, high-
educated workers. 
Calibration
In MIMIC, 33% of the workers are low skilled and 67% high
skilled. Low-skilled workers are subdivided into 36% less-
employable workers (defined as those with an income
below 120% of the minimum wage) and 64% more-employ-
able workers. The group of high-skilled workers is equally
split between 50% of the lowest incomes, who will 
be called less-employable workers, and 50% with the 
highest incomes, who will be called more-employable
workers.
With regard to the incentives for training in MIMIC, note
that the after-tax wage of the more-employable, low-skilled
worker is around 50% higher than the average wage of a
less employable, low-skilled worker. For high-skilled work-
ers, this after-tax wage differential is somewhat larger,
namely 57%. The average after-tax wage differential
between high-skilled and low-skilled workers is almost
40%.
The transition rate from less-employable, low-skilled
labour towards more-employable, low-skilled labour is
12%. For the high skilled, this transition rate is 8%. The
transition rate from low-skilled into high-skilled labour
is slightly less than 3% per year (see de Mooij, 1999, for
a foundation of these figures). 
The individual transition rate of workers who train dif-
fers from those who do not. The difference between tran-
sition rates determines the rate of return to training for
which we use estimates from the literature. In particular,
we set the rate of return on training at 21% (Groot and
Maassen van den Brink, 1998). The rate of return to school-
ing is set at 8%. In 1996, 34% of the workers enrolled in
an on-the-job training programme, while 13% participated
in an educational programme.
A final important parameter in the calibration of the
model is the effect of after-tax wage differentials on the
incentives to train. Groot and Oosterbeek (1995) find that
the effect of after-tax wage differentials on the share of
households that participates in training is significantly 
positive, but small. For the US, Dupor et al. (1996) find
a larger effect: a 10% rise in the marginal tax will lead
to approximately a 15% decline in human capital invest-
ment. 
Figure 1 MIMIC’s training model in a 
nutshell
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We use a value that is an average of these two studies: a
1% rise in the replacement ratio between high-employ-
able and low-employable workers in our model raises the
fraction of households that enrol in training by 0.008.
Simulations with MIMIC
Table 1 reveals the labour-market implications of four tax
experiments in a version of MIMIC without a training model
(i.e. where we set training elasticities equal to zero). Table
2 shows how the training model modifies these simula-
tion results. In particular, it contains the difference between 
a version of MIMIC with training and the one without train-
ing. 
In each of the four experiments, the government reduces
the tax burden by 0.5% of GDP and reduces government
consumption by an equivalent amount (ex-ante). The gov-
ernment budget is maintained ex-post through adjust-
ments in government consump-
tion. Hence, taxes and social pre-
miums remain constant over time
after the policy is imposed. The
experiments presented in Tables 1
and 2 are (1) a reduction in the first
tax bracket; (2) a reduction in the
third tax bracket; (3) an Earned
Income Tax Credit of DFL 5800
based on hourly wages that is
phased out between the minimum
wage and 130% of the minimum
wage rate; (4) an EITC of DFL 2200
that is phased out on the basis of annual income between
the minimum wage and 130% of the minimum wage. The
effects of these policies on labour supply, unemployment
and employment have been discussed in detail by
Bovenberg, Graafland and de Mooij (1999) and Graafland
and de Mooij (1999). Table 1 summarises the main results.
It reveals that reductions in marginal tax rates are most
effective in stimulating aggregate labour supply in hours
(first two columns). Targeted reductions in the average tax
burden on the low-skilled are most effective in cutting
unemployment (last two columns)
This paper concentrates on the implications of adding
the training model for the allocation of labour supply
across skills and for production. Table 2 contains these
effects. It includes the impact on the fractions of employ-
able workers in total low-skilled and high-skilled labour,
the impact of schooling on the fraction of high-skilled
workers in total labour, and the
effect on production. Note that the
household model of MIMIC distin-
guishes between two types of low-
skilled workers (more and less
employable), but only one type of
high-skilled labour. The higher frac-
tion of employable high-skilled
workers therefore does not affect
production through a different com-
position of high-skilled labour sup-
ply in the household model, but
rather through an increase in a
training index. This index directly
affects the productivity of high-
skilled workers in the model of the
firm.
Lower marginal taxes
A lower tax rate in the first bracket
is relatively attractive for low-skilled,
more-employable workers and for
high-skilled, less-employable work-
ers. The high basic tax deduction
implies only a small benefit for the 
Table 1 Labour-market effects of four simulations according 
to MIMICa
(1) (2) (3) (4)
percentage changes
Labour supply (hours) – 0.31 – 0.46 – 0.24 – 1.06
Employment – 0.76 – 0.79 – 1.80 – 0.01
Unemployment rate – 0.27 – 0.18 – 1.00 – 0.78
Production – 0.72 – 0.74 – 1.04 – 0.02
a Cumulated differences between simulation and base projection.
(1) Reduction in the first tax bracket
(2) Reduction in the third tax bracket
(3) EITC based on hourly wages, phased out between 100 - 130% minimum wage
(5) EITC based on annual incomes, phased out between 100 - 130% minimum wage
Table 2 Consequences of adding the training model to MIMIC in
the four simulationsa
(1) (2) (3) (4)
percentage changes
Training effects
– fraction employable 
low-skilled – 0.08 – 0.06 – 2.44 – 0.72
– fraction employable 
high-skilled – 0.17 – 1.68 – 0.46 – 0.18
– fraction high skilled – 0.00 – 0.17 – 0.36 – 0.12
Labour supply (hours) – 0.00 – 0.04 – 0.01 – 0.00
•  low skilled
– less employable – 0.10 – 0.34 – 3.36 – 0.90
– more employable – 0.05 – 0.22 – 1.02 – 0.34
•  high skilled – 0.01 – 0.05 – 0.16 – 0.04
Production – 0.02 – 0.19 – 0.16 – 0.06
a Differences between simulations with MIMIC  –  with and without the training model
(1) Reduction in the first tax bracket
(2) Reduction in the third tax bracket
(3) EITC based on hourly wages, phased out between 100 - 130% minimum wage
(5) EITC based on annual incomes, phased out between 100 - 130% minimum wage 
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low-skilled, less employable, while the high-skilled work-
ers with higher incomes are largely taxed in the higher
tax brackets (which are not reduced). Accordingly, low-
skilled workers are encouraged to enrol in training efforts
so that the composition of low-skilled labour supply
changes in favour of more employable workers, at the
expense of less-employable workers. In contrast, the lower
first tax bracket reduces the incentives for training by the
high-skilled. The effect on schooling is negligible, so that
the fraction of high-skilled labour remains more or less
unchanged.
Reductions in the third tax bracket increase the relative
wage differentials between less- and more-employable,
high-skilled workers. Therefore, this policy is more effec-
tive in stimulating the training of high-skilled workers than
are reductions in the first bracket. This boosts produc-
tion through an increase in the training index for high-
skilled labour. Furthermore, by raising the relative wage
differential between low- and high-skilled workers, a lower
third bracket stimulates the incentives for schooling by
the low skilled. Accordingly, high-skilled labour supply
expands at the expense of low-skilled labour supply. Since
the third tax bracket is not relevant for most low-skilled
workers, it exerts only a small effect on their incentives
for training. The improvement in the quality of the labour
force through training and schooling raises the produc-
tion effect of a lower third tax bracket by 0.19%, compared
to the model without training.
Targeted tax reductions to the low-skilled
The third column of  Table 2 presents the effects of an EITC
of DFL 5800 for hourly wages at the minimum wage. The
EITC is phased out linearly between the minimum wage
and 130% of the minimum wage. This policy is attractive
for reducing the unemployment rate, especially among
the low skilled (Bovenberg et al., 1999). However, the EITC
typically reduces income differentials between less- and
more-employable low-skilled workers. Accordingly, this 
policy diminishes the incentives for training of low-skilled
workers. Table 2 reveals that this reduces the fraction of
employable low-skilled workers by 2.44%. The EITC also
reduces the after-tax wage differential between low-skilled
and high-skilled jobs, thereby reducing the incentives for 
schooling. This reinforces the increase in the less-employ-
able low-skilled labour supply. The effect on more-employ-
able low-skilled labour supply depends on the relative
importance of the negative effects through training (caus-
ing substitution from more-employable towards less-
employable low-skilled labour supply) and the positive
effect through schooling (which induces substitution from
high-skilled towards low-skilled labour). On balance, we
find that the training effect dominates the schooling effect. 
Hence, more-employable low-skilled labour contracts.
Some less-employable high-skilled workers also benefit
from the EITC, so that high-skilled workers are discour-
aged in acquiring more skills through training. This effect
is substantially smaller than for low-skilled workers, how-
ever. These results suggest that an EITC based on hourly
wages tends to hamper the upgrading of skills, especially
at the bottom of the labour market. This adversely affects
overall labour productivity in the economy. Indeed, adverse
effects on the quality of labour supply due to an EITC are 
responsible for a decline in production of 0.16%, as com-
pared to the model without training.
If the phase-out of the EITC is based on annual income,
rather than hourly wages, the fourth column of  Table 2
shows that the adverse training and schooling effects are
substantially smaller than in the previous experiment.
This is because the EITC is less well targeted at the less-
employable low-skilled. Indeed, by making the EITC depen-
dent on annual income, high-skilled workers with small
part-time jobs also benefit. Hence, after-tax wage differ-
entials between low-skilled and high-skilled workers and
less- and more-employable workers decline less sharply
than in the previous experiment. This renders the adverse
effect on training and schooling also smaller.
Conclusions
This paper shows how the extension of MIMIC with a train-
ing model affects the simulation results of tax policies. It
shows that reductions in marginal tax rates favour train-
ing and schooling incentives. Targeted tax reductions for
the low skilled – which typically raise the marginal tax bur-
den – cause adverse effects on training and schooling,
especially for the low skilled. The training model thus has
important implications for the effect of taxation on the
quality of labour supply and, therefore, production. To
illustrate, without a training model, an EITC is the most
effective instrument to cut unemployment and to boost
production. By including the training model, the increase
in production is smaller than in case of a reduction in
the marginal tax rate in the third bracket. The training
model thus adds a new trade-off to MIMIC, namely,
between tax policies that are effective in cutting unem-
ployment and those that raise productivity.
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Notes
1 The author thanks André Nibbelink for research assistance and Johan
Graafland and Maarten Cornet for useful comments.
2 This approach contrasts with most of the literature on taxation and human
capital, which typically adopts a life-cycle approach (see De Mooij (1997) for
a survey). The advantage of our approach is that it allows for a better cali-
bration of the model, since empirical evidence on the factors affecting train-
ing enrolment is available from the literature.
3 Although we ignore investment decisions of firms, this does not mean that
MIMIC deals solely with off-the-job training. Theory and evidence suggest
that workers tend to have an important impact on on-the-job training deci-
sions as well, even if they do not bear the financial costs of training (see e.g.
Groot and Oosterbeek, 1995). Indeed, if workers have no incentive to train, it
is difficult for employers to affect the human capital of their employees. We
therefore interpret training as both on-the-job training and off-the-job train-
ing.
4 The literature suggests that proportional taxes on labour income can be
neutral with respect to human capital formation. This occurs if all cost of
training is tax deductible, e.g. in case of foregone working time. In our model,
the effort costs of training are untaxed. Proportional taxes are neverthe-
less neutral with respect to training, since we adopt a logarithmic utility func-
tion. Indeed, using this specification implies that only relative wage differ-
entials between different employability states (e.g. due to changes in tax pro-
gression) affect the incentives for training.
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Abstract
This paper investigates MIMIC’s capacity to explain
the labour market developments for the Netherlands
from the early seventies until the early nineties. MIMIC’s
findings fit the actual trends between 1972 and 1993
quite well. The increase in equilibrium unemployment
during 1972-1993 can largely be explained by an
increase in the consumer price relative to the producer
price (which is partly due to a deterioration of the terms
of trade). Less important factors are a rise in the aver-
age tax- and social premium rate and a rise in the
real interest rate.
Introduction
Applied general equilibrium models are among the most
influential tools in applied economics. In the Netherlands,
CPB’s MIMIC model has successfully explored a number
of actual policy questions.2 As Donders and Graafland
(1998) argue, there are some clear cases in which MIMIC
analyses have had a substantial influence on actual polit-
ical decisions on the implementation of concrete tax pro-
posals.
In light of the influence of MIMIC analysis on the Dutch
policy debate, interest has grown in the empirical relia-
bility of MIMIC. Because applied general equilibrium mod-
els focus so strongly on their microeconomic theoretical
base, the empirical foundation of these models is gener-
ally considered to be rather weak. The core of the critique
is that the parameter selection criteria are unsound and
that the use of first-order (CES class) functional forms
imposes influential restrictions on the model’s structure
(McKitrick, 1998). Also Nestor and Pasurka (1995) show
that results of AGE analysis can be sensitive to the func-
tional forms adopted.
This might also hold for MIMIC. Although several parts
in the MIMIC model are based on empirical research, other
parts have a weaker empirical basis. This raises doubt about
the reliability of the simulation results. In order to evaluate
this uncertainty, the MIMIC team often uses sensitivity
analysis to investigate the robustness of the simulation
results (Nieuwenhuis and Boone, 1998). Indeed, sensitiv-
ity analysis is widely used to assess the reliability of con-
clusions derived from AGE models (Harrison et al., 1993).
